Original Research

An existential phenomenology for ethical systems inquiry: Churchman’s heroic mood

Tania C. Gill

Received: 21 July 2025; Accepted: 18 Nov. 2025; Published: 20 Jan. 2026

Copyright: © 2026. The Author. Licensee: AOSIS.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Abstract

Background: Churchman’s pragmatic epistemological systems philosophy has influenced the praxis of perspective-taking methods to deal with a class of problems known as wicked problems. Churchman’s philosophy has not yet been interpreted as an existential phenomenology that deals with the inquirer’s experience with and attitude towards perspective-taking collaborative approaches.

Objectives: This study aims to build an argument for the repositioning of Churchman as an existential phenomenologist based on his treatment of his heroic mood. This repositioning may serve to balance epistemological pragmatism with existential phenomenological atonement to the problem situation.

Method: An argument is built based on an in-depth literature study of Churchman’s writing and comparisons drawn to existential phenomenological literature. This literature study is used to uncover and interpret the structure of Churchman’s heroic mood and systems journey and the role of the heroic mood within it as it links to existential phenomenological themes.

Results: Churchman’s heroic mood emerges as the root of his ethical approach to systems inquiry in the context of wicked problems. This shows that Churchman’s philosophy can do more to help inquirers deal with perspective-taking collaborative approaches.

Conclusion: Churchman’s overt epistemological pragmatism is complimented functionally in an important way by his latent existential phenomenology. This needs to be made more overt to complement the important ongoing epistemological work aiming to take the systems approach further.

Contribution: This study helps to further unpack the ethics of the systems approach to wicked problems, strengthening the foundation on which we can build in terms of what it means to be an ethical guide and leader in perspective-taking collaborative spaces.

Keywords: C. West Churchman; systems thinking; ethical inquiry; wicked problems; heroic mood; journey; existentialism; phenomenology.

Introduction

Existential phenomenology can contribute to ethics by offering a way to study the structure of our attitude or will to shape the world. The structure of such an attitude in the context of intervention in systems is explored by C. West Churchman. Churchman is a foundational philosopher in the field of systems thinking that forms part of General Systems Theory (GST). General Systems Theory is a meta-theory approach dating back to Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972) that seeks transdisciplinarity for better outcomes in whole systems, offering a new Weltanschauung for the sciences and the humanities to help solve complex real-world problems (Hofkirchner & Schafranek 2011; Skyttner 2005). Churchman, at the outset, is driven by the plight of the unfortunate and considers the morality of our desire to do good, and his philosophy is primarily an epistemological pragmatism driven by moral outrage (Jackson 2019; Mason & Mitroff 2015; Mitroff 1994; Van Gigch, Koenigsberg & Dean 1997). Churchman is interested in implementation (change for the better) in the context of a specific class of problems called wicked problems, and he investigates how such problems can be investigated using systems thinking. To this end, Churchman developed his ethically grounded systems approach.

Churchman did not coin the term ‘wicked problem’, but in 1967, he was the first to define wicked problems based on a lecture given by Horst Rittel. Churchman defines wicked problems as social system problems that are characterised by the inclusion of many stakeholders, value conflicts and unclear system consequences (1967:B-141). The term continues to be used as a catchall term for complex social problems and the dangers of reductionist approaches to solving such problems (Lonngren & Van Poeck 2021; Sweeting 2018). By 2017, over 200 articles had been published yearly on wicked problems (Lonngren & Van Poeck 2021:481). The interest in wicked problems lies in the caution the term represents against trends in ‘evidence-based’ policy making that may lead to too narrow an understanding of complex social problems (Head 2019:180).

For Churchman, there is an ethical imperative to approach wicked problems in as comprehensive a way as possible and not to deceive others by saying that the beast (the wicked problem) has been tamed, when only the beast’s roar has been quieted (Churchman 1967:B-141). Churchman builds a systems approach to counter such unethical deception. Churchman first calls his systems approach a theory of deception in The Systems Approach (1968b:229) and later calls it a journey in The Systems Approach and its Enemies (1979:26). Taken together, he offers a systems approach that revolves around taking the longest possible journey (maximum loop) that aims to reveal to us all the ways we may be deceived and so escape the fallacies of narrow-minded thinking. A prospective hero feels the imperative to leave ‘safe lands’ and transform not only their way of thinking but also their way of ‘seeing’ the problem. The prospective hero endures on this journey because of their adoption of the heroic mood.

Churchman’s pragmatic epistemological project can be characterised as a search for a rational extension of the positive scientific method in a way that allows us to reach meaningful conclusions for the betterment of the human condition that can be guaranteed to be meaningful (Churchman 1955, 1974, 1994; Churchman & Mitroff 1994; ed. Van Gigch 2006). Churchman’s systems approach has been studied extensively in terms of its overt pragmatism and its epistemological usefulness. A number of ‘soft’ systems methodologies emerged from Churchman’s work that drew on dialogue, collaborative learning and participatory approaches. Foremost of these methodologies are Mason and Mitroff’s Assumptions Surfacing and Testing (SAST), Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), Forrester’s Systems Dynamics (SD), Ulrich’s Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) and various forms of cybernetic and dialectic designs (Jackson 2019; eds. Metcalf, Kijima & Deguchi 2021). All these approaches seek to stay true to Churchman’s overall aim of overcoming the limits of working on wicked problems using only modelling and computational approaches (‘hard’ systems approaches). Approaches emanating from Churchman’s philosophy attempt to move from naïve realism to more nuanced rational approaches to analysing wicked problems and finding inclusive solutions (Lane 2024:895). The history and development of systems thinking are well documented and extensively written on (Jackson 2019; eds. Metcalf et al. 2021). And it is a field that continues to look for new traction to bring the systems approach forward and keep its place as an important aid for intervening in complex problem areas.

The continuing challenge that drives this article is Lane’s (2024) observation that this approach still needs to do more work to deal with conflict between different perspectives in practice. Worldviews are associated with the creation of shared identities and can therefore be powerful forces in multi-stakeholder participative processes (Lane 2024:898). Klein et al. (2023:975) also observe that systems theory needs to develop better modes for collaborative agency. Much of Churchman’s writing is aimed at helping inquirers learn how to overcome the difficulty of a perspective-taking approach (Forsgren in ed. McIntyre-Mills 2006:24). Churchman’s philosophy can do more to help inquirers in this regard if an existential phenomenological lens is adopted.

Philosophically, Churchman is positioned as an epistemological pragmatist, but here it is argued that he should also be repositioned as an existential phenomenologist. This repositioning is done based on his treatment of his heroic mood, which emerges as an existential phenomenological foundation for ethical systems inquiry. The repositioning of Churchman’s philosophy is vital for ethical systems inquiry because it balances epistemological pragmatism with existential phenomenological attunement to the problem situation. This attunement shapes the inquirer’s experience in and with the world and their relationship with others. In this way, we may come to understand Churchman’s thesis that the gateway into addressing wicked problems ‘is through human feelings’ (Churchman 1984:226).

The maximum loop

In Challenge to Reason (1968a:113), Churchman describes the maximum loop as the opposite of a minimum loop that leads from x to x. The minimum loop searches for the simplest logical proof statements on which inquiry can build, in the style of Descartes (Churchman 1968a:113). The maximum loop, on the other hand, says that ‘self-reflection is possible only if one returns to the self after the longest possible journey’ (Churchman 1968a:113). This principle guides the pursuit of Churchman’s ideal form of rationality, in which man becomes more rational to the extent that they can use as much of the world as possible to understand themselves (Churchman 1968a:105). Embarking on a maximum loop affords the opportunity to ‘sweep in’ as much of the world as possible by looking at a holistically imagined world from many different perspectives and setting up a dialectic between these perspectives as a method to counter the possibility of deception. Fundamentally, the maximum loop is an opportunity to apperceive (Churchman 1968a:141). This is a difficult and tentative idea that remains essentially vague. Churchman does not believe that the maximum loop can be mathematically modelled, and that it therefore requires a human inquirer embracing his ideal form of rationality to escape the narrow-mindedness of more traditional rational mindsets.

The chasm

By moving beyond the narrow-mindedness of more traditional scientific mindsets, the inquirer becomes aware that there will always be a chasm between what can be guaranteed to be known, even with the greatest effort to be comprehensive, and the totality of the wicked problem. This gap is both epistemological (a knowledge gap) and existential (a feeling of inadequacy). The experience of lack in the face of the chasm can create a sense of alienation from science itself, and how the inquirer responds to this gap is crucial to the trajectory of the inquiry. The inquirer can respond through despair, avoidance or perseverance on the maximum loop to become less deceived and ‘see’ more. Choosing perseverance in the face of this gap is the lonely part of Churchman’s systems approach (Ulrich 1985). Discovering this lonely part of inquiry is one of the central aims of Churchman’s book The Design of Inquiring Systems (1971:6). The book is divided into two parts. The first part is called ‘A Classification of Systems’ (p. 2) and is a hefty discussion of five different epistemologies for the design of inquiring systems. The second part is called ‘Speculations on Systems Design’ (p. 208) and delves into the lonely part of inquiry – into what we are to do about this gap in our ability to guarantee our knowledge claims.

The epistemological perspectives discussed in the first part of The Design of Inquiring Systems (1971) are: Leibnizian deductive inquiry, Lockean inductive inquiry, Kantian experimental and empirical inquiry, Hegelian dialectic inquiry and Singerian ethical inquiry that includes competing voices (Metcalfe 2006). These perspectives are complementary and together show us not complete comprehensiveness but the limits of these perspectives to give us a ‘Utopia’ of systems design (Ulrich 1985:873). Each type of inquiry still has built-in deceptions that require a human inquirer to self-reflect on his inquiry and the design of inquiring system and to take responsibility for the gap of guarantee that emerges (Ulrich 1985:874).

The second part of The Design of Inquiring Systems (1971) is met with less discussion in reviews of Churchman’s work, and unpacking this aspect of his writing is a way of continuing the philosophical journey that he started. As Mason and Mitroff conclude Churchman’s philosophical quest: ‘Wisdom knows that the conversation must go on’ (Mason & Mitroff 2015:45). Churchman identifies three dominant scientific attitudes [Weltanschauungs] that can be adopted and combined with a pluralistic approach to epistemological perspectives to drive the inquiry process. These attitudes are: Democritean (mechanistic), Aristotelian (teleological) and Carnedean (randomness/probability). Churchman regards these attitudes as guiding imageries that have historically driven scientific inquiry (Churchman 1971:209). Triangulating between these imageries is a strong but still limited position. Churchman warns that the continual extension of these imageries can turn them into ‘cancerous growths’ (Churchman 1971:217) that can end up inhibiting rather than promoting knowledge acquisition. Instead of relying on these old scientific attitudes, the inquirer needs an entirely different attitude (Churchman 1971:251) and must be willing to defend this attitude (Churchman 1968a:133).

The answer to what should be done about the chasm in terms of its existential implications is then to adopt a new attitude so that there can be perseverance on the maximum loop. Churchman calls this new attitude the heroic mood, which embraces apperception and ‘combines the aspirations of a do-gooder with the tragic mood that the world is too big and too powerful for us mortals to cope with’ (Churchman 1968a:142). This mood is, for Churchman, ‘the basis of the human spirit; the applied scientists is – or struggles to be – both a humanist and a scientist’ (Churchman 1968a:134).

The heroic mood

The structure of Churchman’s heroic mood emerges from his argument that the search for a possible different Weltanschauung requires that the inquiring perspective shift from esoteric to exoteric (Churchman 1971: 217). Weltanschauungs are not fixed goals but rather ‘stand as limit points in our endless pursuit of more and more understanding’ (Churchman 1971:257). When locked into the three traditional imageries, which are esoteric, science tends to choose a feasible way to investigate a segment of the whole wicked problem and ‘take a rather modest attitude with respect to total, real improvement’ (Churchman 1971:223). An exoteric decision is validated by whether implementation leads to a ‘betterment’ for the collective community (Churchman 1971:225). Churchman explores the idea that accepting this challenge to develop an exoteric perspective requires different attitudes that relate to the overarching heroic mood. Three key attitudes stand out in particular: the attitudes of faith, aesthetics and mind. There is a dynamic relationship between faith, aesthetics, mind and the reflection that constitutes Churchman’s ideal rationality. Faith is, however, the core enabler of the other attitudes and appears as a ‘spectre’ throughout Churchman’s writing (Swanson 1994:57).

Mind

The attitude of mind refers to the importance of the natural mind of the inquirer. The natural mind of the inquirer is the part of the mind that thinks, feels, senses and has intuition (Churchman 1971:261–262). It is the mind that can ‘move’ and develop, feeding back into the natural expression of the self and becoming embedded in the inquiry. In this way, all inquiry becomes a natural expression of who you are (Churchman 1971:268). This enables commitment to meaningful insights and not just results. The inquirer can adapt and draw on their own experience and intuition.

Aesthetics

The attitude of aesthetics goes deeper than the goals of the inquiry and the design of the inquiring process. It represents the depths of individuality from which every inquirer engages in inquiry and underpins why an individual is engaging in the inquiry (Churchman 1971:251). The aesthetic attitude activates a deep personal engagement with the wicked problem. Without aesthetics, there is dissociation with the wicked problem, resulting in outward shows of sympathy rather than deep empathy.

Faith

The attitude of faith is necessary because for the inquirer ‘there is no safe and assured pathway ahead’, and there must be a dogmatic belief that inquiry can succeed (Churchman 1971:237). Without belief in the systems approach, there is less motivation to strive towards the limits of inquiry, and the inquirer will settle for the smaller gains of taming the growl rather than the beast. To embrace faith also means that we need to embrace the reality of deception in all knowledge claims. Faith and deception are the two faces of Janus; they ‘are two sides of the same process’ (Churchman 1971:243). Insofar as the systems approach is a theory of deception, it is then equally a theory of faith. Faith is the enabler of the other attitudes because it provides the deep commitment necessary for the inquirer to self-reflect and attach with deep empathy.

The journey

This exoteric pursuit of the maximum loop driven by the heroic mood is called a journey by Churchman. The outcome of this journey is a hero who can bring the reality and the dream of comprehensiveness closer together. On this journey, Churchman regards the hero as acting as a link or connection to the maximum loop in broader social contexts. In The Design of Inquiring Systems (1971), Churchman offers a key to further unlock his meaning. Churchman refers to Joseph Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces ([1949]2008) as describing ‘the structure of the mood’ (Churchman 1971:203). The three-act structure of Campbell’s journey (the departure or separation, the initiation and the return) can be overlaid with the structure of Churchman’s journey as revealed in The Systems Approach (Churchman 1968b). Churchman’s journey can be partitioned into three separate phases that this article calls the beast, the archangel and the transformation. These phases can also be related to important recurring themes in existentialism.

The beast

In the beast phase, the prospective hero has an awakening moment in which they become aware of the limits of narrow-minded thinking and familiar approaches to addressing wicked problems (to tame the beast). Churchman refers to the need to break the shackles that bind the inquirer to one representation of the whole system and the idea that this whole system can be modelled (Churchman 1968b:72). This sentiment corresponds well with the first phase of Campbell’s journey (the departure), where there is a letting go of naivety and of the ties that bind the prospective hero to what is in their immediate best interest (Campbell [1949]2008:49). Breaking from the confines of the ‘everyday’ and ways of doing in the past risks self-destruction, and it is possible for a prospective hero to end the adventure at this point and remain in the safe realms of the familiar (Campbell [1949]2008:68,77). The alternative is to forge on and enter and exit ‘the belly of the whale’ to confront the enormity of the task and the emerging awareness of the void that springs from our inability to guarantee our knowledge claims.

Existentialism has a strong focus on themes relating to the individual’s ability to shape their own future and the responsibility attached to this freedom (Macquarrie 1973:3–5). The responsibility to be taken up here is to confront the beast in its full form and not try to tame its growl from the haven of the familiar. Churchman uses the myth of Sisyphus to help illustrate his meaning that models can come to embody the endless ‘work to be done’ to confront the beast (1968b:57). In line with Camus’ treatment of the myth in The Myth of Sisyphus (1955) where joy is found in the absurdity and despair of the endless task (Camus 1955:97), Churchman calls on the prospective hero to embrace the absurdity of the struggle to address wicked problems (Churchman 1968a:142). Even though there is a void between what we can claim to know and the full nature of the wicked problem, there is meaning in the struggle that cannot be unburdened onto models (1968b:78).

The archangel

The archangel represents a settling for lesser gains and the cutting short of the struggle in the void. In the archangel phase, Churchman warns that the management scientist confronted by ‘the muddy swamps of reality’ (Churchman 1968b:81) may be tempted to be guided by the archangel of feasibility (Churchman 1968b:85). Feasibility can be understood here as taking traditional scientific Weltanschauungs and driving them to their full potential. The ideal of comprehensiveness is forsaken for the archangel. If the struggle continues to be embraced, the inquirer embarks on Churchman’s maximum loop. If the heroic mood is adopted, the hero can engage in the maximum loop in a way that functions as a limit function struggling to approach comprehensiveness even if it cannot be reached. The heroic mood gives a vector-like force and direction to the journey. This phase corresponds well with the second phase of Campbell’s journey (initiation) in which the landscape beyond ‘the belly of the whale’ is an ambiguous space filled with trials that need to be survived ([1949]2008:81). The ego repeatedly tempts the hero to find an easier way out of the trials. If there is perseverance, there will be a continuous path of overcoming and enlightenment (Campbell [1949]2008:90), pushing the hero to learn to cope with the full force of the problem situation (Campbell [1949]2008:101) and become a guide to others (Campbell [1949]2008:127).

The struggle within the void, and the becoming it unlocks, reflects the human condition that cannot be unburdened onto systems designed to exist external to ourselves. To succumb to the temptation to settle for lesser gains represents an unethical leaning towards deception. Deception remains one of the strongest and most fundamental themes of all of Churchman’s writing. It underpins the systems approach and the journey and ‘becomes an especially strong moral issue when one deceives people into thinking that something is safe when it is highly dangerous’ (Churchman 1967:B-142). In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche ([1872]1967) argues that modern rationalism, having lost its connection to meaningful existence, sought its comfort in scientific and technological explanations [‘deus ex machina’] for human suffering (p. 109). This led to the death of tragedy in Western thought. The ‘deus ex machina’ is a plot device used in ancient Greek plays that functions to help solve intractable plot dilemmas and save a play from succumbing to total tragedy. The consolatory function of the ‘deus ex machina’ (a device ‘swooping in’ to save the day) in solving intractable dilemmas for the tragedy of existence rings empty and cannot anchor the journey of the hero or the mood of the journey. For Nietzsche, as for Churchman, a higher ethics emerges if we can free ourselves from the dogma of traditional rationalism (Flynn 2006:40).

The transformation

Even if the inquirer remains committed to an honest and lucid grappling with the wicked problem, there may still be a temptation to be lost to idealism and lose connection to the reality. The final transformation of the inquirer occurs when they can offer a deception-free resolution to the wicked problem for implementation. The offered implementation strives for comprehensiveness but remains grounded in the reality. Churchman morally charges his ideal inquirer to ‘be in the reality and the vision’ (Churchman 1979:214). In Campbell’s journey, the hero is tasked to return to the community (the reality) with a boon (a gift from the ideal) and must not be lost to gazing at the ideal (Campbell [1949]2008:167). Campbell’s hero can, however, become one with the idealised embodiment of comprehensiveness and so unify the reality and the dream, granting a powerful boon to the community. The unification and embodied learning signify the end of the journey. For Churchman, the reality and the vision will always remain separate. This means the hero must journey repeatedly to bring the reality and the vision closer together, and there is no discernible end to the process.

The themes of transforming and returning in the context of inquiry are crucial because inquiry into wicked problems is always for someone – for some exoteric goal. Questions of implementation come first and last for Churchman (Churchman 1994; Churchman & Mitroff 1994). Therefore, the journey is not for the sake of the self but for the sake of the ‘Other’. The relationship between the inquirer and the ‘Other’ is important for Churchman, and it is existential phenomenology’s failure to capture the connection to the collective that leads Churchman away from this work (Churchman 1979:77). Yet the sentiment of being with and ‘for’ the ‘Other’ does find echoes in the work of Heidegger. Heidegger invokes the importance of a caring mood. This caring is not an inner-subjective positive romantic mood of kindness but a deep individual willingness to be open (receptive) to the world into which we are thrown (Wheeler 2011). Heidegger is concerned with the estrangement of aesthetics from our ‘being’ (Barrett [1958]1990:207). ‘Being’ in a situation is about deep immersion combined with openness (Barrett [1958]1990:212). Phenomenologically, this means that we need to be adaptable to let a situation speak for itself rather than forcing it to conform to our pre-conceptions (Barrett [1958]1990:214). To do this, Heidegger says we need a mood [Stimmung] that is not a state of mind but an attuned openness that serves the ‘Other’ (Barrett [1958]1990:221). Churchman similarly describes morality as a collective psychic force that erupts through individual behaviour rather than as an individual state of mind (Churchman 1979:166).

In the context of Churchman, caring is about activating a sense of aesthetics as part of the heroic mood to combat the dissociation that may arise in the face of the gap in our ability to guarantee knowledge claims. Without the transformative impact of caring, there is avoidance and despair. The deep individual willingness to be open and attuned emerges through an existential process of ‘becoming’. This transformative emergent individuality is shaped by the journey and is not reducible to ‘study-able’ values, beliefs, knowledge or behaviour (Churchman 1979:76–77). This corresponds with the existentialist view that the inner life of the individual shapes the trajectory of their ‘becoming’ (Macquarrie 1973:3–5).

Visual summary

This process and the role of the heroic mood can be represented visually (Figure 1). For a systems inquirer trying to deal with wicked problems for the benefit of the whole community, choosing any of the three red exit points represents an unethical decision path guided by attitudes other than the heroic mood. These decision paths are unethical because an attempt has not been made to approach comprehensiveness, and the inquirer is not being honest with the community and perhaps not with themselves. The black spiral represents the trajectory of a systems inquirer that glimpses comprehensiveness and is not tempted by the archangel to settle for lesser gains, but who becomes lost in the ongoing unfolding process of the maximum loop. This inquirer fails to find an appropriate timing of the decision to exit the loop and offer a practical implementation recommendation for the community. The process becomes unending in a negative way that does not benefit the community.

FIGURE 1: The systems journey and the heroic mood.

The heroic mood is the enabler of the green decision path, in which the choice is repeatedly made to take up the challenge of approaching comprehensiveness through the maximum loop and taking the leap of faith to exit the loop and offer up implementation to the community. The inquirer on this trajectory is also open about the un-comprehensiveness of the recommendation and is willing to re-enter the journey to bring the reality and the dream closer together. The heroic mood underpins these choices. The relationship with the community is built on honesty, trust and faith in the journey. The journey driven by the heroic mood is also unending but is unending in a way that benefits the community through distinct breaks in which recommendations are tried and tested and, on this basis, even better implementations sought.

In this way, we can come to understand Churchman’s meaning when he advocates for mood to be ‘carried along’ into decision making in addition to intellect (Churchman 1975:19). And we can come to understand the journey not just as pragmatic (relying on experience of what works) but as existential as well. According to Lipps (2008–2010), ‘existential philosophy in its desire for intellectual honesty, makes its appeal to the earnestness of the individual’ (p. 108). Lipps further argues that existentialism ‘opens the space through which reflection must travel … [and] [w]e would only like to determine the direction of the path of this thought’ (2008–2010:108).

Churchman’s existential phenomenology

As a reaction to scientism, phenomenology claims we are limited in our understanding if we only understand rationally or scientifically (Husserl 1969). Phenomenology is a method of revealing what is hidden (to be less deceived). Lisa Guenther (in eds. Weiss, Murphy & Salamon 2020:14–15) reflects on the poetry of Audre Lorde that reflects on the ‘quality of light’ that has a bearing on how we see and experience our world. Phenomenologically, this quality of light is ‘the affective tonality or mood that both motivates and contour’s one’s meaningful experience as an embodied Being-in-the-world’ (Guenther in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:14). This process of illumination is guided by a mood that shapes our being in the world, a process of unfolding experience.

According to Merleau-Ponty ([1945]2005), ‘phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner or style of thinking’ (p. viii). This style of thinking is primarily descriptive and reflective (Embree 2013:397), and there is a person having a lived experience whose perspective is always partial but important (Guenther in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:15). The structures and motivations underlying this experience need to be examined (Guenther in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:15). Churchman’s focus on the systems approach and its structure from the perspective of the inquirer, and the importance of the self-reflectiveness of inquiry through the vehicles of mood and becoming, places Churchman’s philosophy in the style of existential phenomenology.

The journey

The structure of Churchman’s phenomenology is tied to the structure of the journey. The journey is interpretable as a method of apperception (breaking deception) to see differently and therefore interpretable as a phenomenological method. This method of journeying precedes interpretation, explanation and decision and is accompanied by an attitude of inquiry. The inquirer on this journey is a human situated within the system of inquiry, not apart from it: Churchman’s dialectic inquiry is not a process ‘that is observed by the individual in the system – it is a process that is lived by them’ (Boland 1981:113). This process is lived through a method of mood and illumination that is tested on a maximum loop, where a rationality of self-reflection is embraced.

This phenomenological journey is also existential as it encapsulates a process of achieving a form of non-conformity. For existentialism, non-conformity is a process of being ‘on the way’ as the human condition is bound in time and never a static completion (Flynn 2006:24). In early existentialism, there is also faith in something ‘beyond’ rationality and scientific inquiry that gives meaning to existence (Flynn 2006:25–26). For Kierkegaard, ethical commitment comes from an embrace of faith (Gardiner 2002:97). It is faith that helps us untether from perspectives that may lead us to deceive ourselves and others and enables us to ‘see’ alternative options for action (Gardiner 2002:42). For Kierkegaard, we need to be enabled to be adaptable to change based on deep and meaningful reflection (Gardiner 2002:42) and responsibility comes from our personal attachment to the consequences of our actions (Gardiner 2002:40). Like Churchman, Kierkegaard uses the vehicle of movement through many different perspectives to allow for apperception and the breaking of deception and in this way disrupted the dogmas of his time (Gardiner 2002:44).

The ‘look’

For those who adopt the heroic mood, there is, Churchman argues, a sense of the need to protect oneself from being suspected of being incomplete – a deeply rooted fear that all your inquiry will be called into question if you are seen to be incomplete in some way (Churchman 1971:264). To risk inquiry that is explicit about its incompleteness risks the inquirer being subjected to feelings of shame (Churchman 1971:264). Jean-Paul Sartre’s ‘Look’ is an important aspect of his early philosophy and relates to the understanding of the phenomenon of ‘Otherness’ (McBride in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:211). We are aware of the ‘Other’ as observing us and our actions. For Sartre, the phenomenological experience of the ‘Other’ begins with a feeling of shame – shame is a response to our experience of being looked at. In Churchman’s context, an awareness of the scientist that he is being observed by other scientists. This objectifies the individual and exposes the individual to danger (McBride in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:212).

For the scientist, the danger may be being discredited as a scientist. The ‘Look’ risks defining us spatially and temporally in terms of how we are seen by ‘Others’; we can decide to act in a way that accords with the ‘Look’, or we can act in a way that risks judgement. Yet we cannot escape the fact that we are ‘looked at’ (McBride in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:213). There is a physical concreteness to the experience of being observed that endows phenomenology with a tangible understanding of the physical individual’s experience of themselves in the real world (McBride in eds. Weiss et al. 2020:214). In this way, Churchman touches on the real experience of risk and the wish to avoid shame when making decisions on how to inquire about wicked problems in the world. The heroic mood functions as an enabler of facing and overcoming this potential for shame. The heroic mood requires that we hold onto the ideal that we are regarded as perfectly scientific and rational but accept that this can never be entirely true and embrace the potential for shame by being open about this gap. For Heidegger, our Schuld is our awareness of our lack, and it is on the basis of this awareness that we fall short that we take up the responsibility for our individual actions (Macquarrie 1973:159). Similarly, Churchman calls on the inquirer to be honest about the limits of inquiry and to take responsibility for decisions made based on their inquiry, even if that risks them being shamed for not being scientific enough.

Pragmatism and phenomenology

Bruce Wilshire (1977, 1997) writes of the importance for pragmatism in general to reclaim the phenomenological aspects of its foundations. Their divergence has been driven by pragmatism’s relationship with the scientific method (Barrett [1958]1990:18; Rosenthal & Bourgeois 1977:56). This divide has deepened over time (Cahoone 2021; Wilshire 1997) and influenced the pragmatism of systems thinking (Matthews in ed. McIntyre-Mills 2006:33). Wiiliam James, the teacher of E.A. Singer Jr who was Churchman’s teacher, was critical of pragmatism’s attachment to the scientific method. James, in principle, advocates for contingency rooted in personal experience rather than for ‘a “block” universe that could be enclosed in a single rational system’ (Barrett [1958]1990:18).

James explores the importance of concrete experience in the way that we gain understanding of the world (Wilshire 1997:100). Wilshire (1997) argues that ‘James’ conception of an authentic beginning for thought, a self-validating starting point, penetrates to a primal level of experiencing Nature’ (Wilshire 1997:101). There was, then, an understanding of the importance of the physical human body’s ability to physically cope with the environment within which it finds itself (Wilshire 1997:103). To be able to physically cope with the openness brought about by the radical scientific method of pragmatism requires a stability of experience (interaction with the world) (Wilshire 1997:105). This sense of opening up towards the ‘Other’ requires a form of trust, or, put more strongly, trust is the opening up to the ‘Other’ and stands in relation to faith and reason (Barrett [1958]1990:74).

This idea of empathising with the ‘Other’ is infused deeply throughout Churchman’s writing and, more broadly, soft systems theories. As Churchman says: ‘Any systems planner who has worked actively with managers should quickly come to recognize the central importance of trust in this relationship, and therefore in the systems approach’ (1979:41). Churchman emphasises that trust is an important aspect of faith, hope and love (1979:41). In James’ breathing body analogies, empathy requires that we are able to affirm the existence of the ‘Other’ and ‘willingly [take] its presence into one’s body through the inhaling, inspiring breath’ (Wilshire 1997:107). Here we come close to Churchman’s view that the systems approach starts when you first see the world through the eyes of another. Existential phenomenology is needed to understand this starting experience for inquiry – a visceral feeling held by the hero inquirer.

Conclusion

The systems approach, in its attempt to deal with wicked problems, is a way of being and not just a way of acting. It is not enough to take on the actions of Sisyphus; his attitude needs to be adopted in the sense of not being tempted to unburden ourselves of the responsibility of the endless task. By enabling us to accept individual responsibility and remain open to the ‘Other’, the heroic mood functions as the root source of the ethics of Churchman’s systems approach to dealing with wicked problems. In this way, the latent existential phenomenology of Churchman complements his pragmatic epistemological project. One could argue that the one is not possible without the other. The ethics of his pragmatic epistemology grows from the roots of his existential phenomenology.

What emerges from this reading of Churchman’s philosophy is that the importance of our attitude to the ‘Other’ is embedded in the philosophical foundations of the systems approach, and this needs to be made more overt to complement the important ongoing epistemological work aiming to take the systems approach further. We need to build on this foundation of what it means to be an ethical guide and leader to the ‘Other’ to help steer interventions closer to ethically grounded authentic implementation that strives for comprehensiveness even if comprehensiveness is unattainable. We need to return to the community again and again and be willing to be better and do better, engaging in an unending journey that is positive for the community. Churchman’s ideal systems scientist is a hero not in terms of possessing an ideal set of heroic characteristics, but in terms of possessing a brave willingness to hold the collaborative space open for all, to be brave enough to be the bridge between the dream and the reality, to adopt the attitude of the heroic mood and to take the leap of faith to offer recommendations that make an honest attempt at being comprehensive while also acknowledging that the work is never done. It is an attitude that precedes the epistemology and the ontology of the systems approach and is the root of its ethics.

This article, therefore, shows that Churchman’s philosophy can do more to help inquirers with the difficulty of perspective-taking approaches. This shift is vital for systems inquiry because it allows for pragmatic existentialism to be balanced by the ethics of existential phenomenology. The challenge that is now set is to explore how this existential phenomenology can be incorporated into the systems approach, in practice and in the education of inquirers.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on research originally conducted as part of Tania C. Gill’s doctoral thesis titled ‘The Plight of the Systems Inquirer’ to be submitted to the Department of Information Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Stellenbosch University. The thesis is currently unpublished and not publicly available. The thesis is being supervised by Christiaan Maasdorp. The research has been revised and adapted for journal publication. The author confirms that the content has not been previously published or disseminated and complies with ethical standards for original publication

The author declares that no financial or personal relationships inappropriately influenced the writing of this article.

Tania C. Gill: Conceptualisation; Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing. The author confirms that this work is entirely her own, has reviewed the article, approved the final version for submission and publication and takes full responsibility for the integrity of its findings.

This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and are the product of professional research. It does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The authors are responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.

References