The tradition of critique and the critique of tradition: Some ethical perspectives

Abstract

Background: The philosophical exchange between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas in the late 1960s and early 1970s remains a formative moment in contemporary hermeneutics and critical theory. At its centre lie enduring questions about tradition, critique, understanding and the ethical-political implications of interpretation.
Objectives: This article revisits and critically assesses the Gadamer–Habermas debate by examining its theoretical stakes and ethical consequences. It clarifies how their contrasting positions on ontology, language, tradition and critique inform divergent approaches to moral and political reasoning.
Method: A comparative philosophical reconstruction traces the intellectual trajectories of both thinkers, focusing on three key divergences: their ontological frameworks, the relation between tradition and reason and their differing readings of Aristotle. The analysis draws on primary texts and significant secondary interpretations.
Results: Gadamer’s hermeneutics affirms the formative role of tradition and the dialogical emergence of meaning through language, whereas Habermas insists on critical reflection to uncover power-laden distortions within tradition. Their approaches yield two ethical paradigms: one grounded in phronesis and historical sensibility and the other in rational deliberation and procedural norms.
Conclusion: The debate raises a lasting question: should ethical and political life be guided by a critique of tradition or by a tradition of critique?
Contribution: By offering a structured reappraisal of this exchange, the article contributes to ongoing discussions in ethics, political philosophy and hermeneutic theory and invites renewed reflection on the relevance of both critique and tradition in shaping just societies.